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PANEL 1:
LEGAL AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC
PERSPECTIVES ON
CHRONIC PAIN
DAVID SEMINOWICZ, AMANDA PUSTILNIK, AND STEPHEN RIGG
SPEAKERS: THE HON. ANDRE DAVIS,* KAREN D. DAVIS,** AND HANK
GREELY***
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the first panel, the Honorable Andre Davis (“Judge Davis”), along
with Professors Hank Greely and Karen Davis (“Professor Davis”),
discussed various topics relating to chronic pain.1 The focus of this panel
concerned how chronic pain is medically interpreted and received, as well
as how the legal system deals with the issues created by chronic pain.
The panel tackled several questions regarding chronic pain, one of
which was whether the law is equipped to handle chronic pain related
cases.2 The panel began with the definitions of pain and chronic pain,
descriptions of the types of pain that might be seen clinically and in a
courtroom, and raised the issue of whether chronic pain should be
conceptualized as a disease.3 The discussion then moved to how

Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik.
* Judge Davis serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and is a
member of the MacArthur Foundation Research Network for Law and Neuroscience.
** Professor Davis is a professor in the Department of Surgery and Institute of Medical Science at
the University of Toronto, and is also the head of the Division of Brain, Imaging and BehaviourSystems Neuroscience at the Toronto Western Research Institute.
*** Professor Greely is a professor at Stanford University, and is the director of the Center of Law
and Biosciences.
1. Hon. Andre Davis, Karen D. Davis, & Hank Greely, Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds:
Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 1: Legal and Neuroscientific
Perspectives on Chronic Pain (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 1] (transcript on file with the
editors).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 5–11.
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neuroimaging studies have transformed our understanding of acute and
chronic pain, noting our abilities to understand chronic pain mechanisms
and describing the goal to eventually develop an objective measure of pain.4
Next, the panel discussed why chronic pain based claims are both
important and challenging to the legal system, and how the legal system
currently deals with such claims.5 The first issue raised was that incentives
distort behavior.6 For example, the risks of exaggeration and fraud can arise
when a party and his or her attorney have “skin in the game.” Legal
decision makers’ fear of fraud can have a distorting effect too, leading to
excess suspicion toward claimants with pain disorders. The panel also
discussed various factors that affect pain related cases.7 In particular,
chronic pain related claims arise most often in the administrative law
setting, pursuant to Social Security Disability Insurance or workers’
compensation insurance regimes, but can also arise in tort, ERISA, and
others.8
Then the panel discussed how the advances in neuroimaging science
might (or might not) assist in adjudicating pain questions in various legal
settings.9 The panel discussed whether science has come far enough to find
correlations between certain brain activity and chronic pain, and the validity
and reliability of such correlations and probative evidence.10 The panel
highlighted the “reverse inference problem” in interpreting brain scans; that
is, a particular scan pattern may correlate with a particular mental state, like
the state of being in pain, but many different mental states could produce
similar looking brain patterns.11 This reverse inference problem is one facet

4. Id. at 11–13.
5. Id. at 13–15.
6. See id. at 16–17 (indicating that Davis, J. and Prof. Karen Davis discussed how the
contingent fee arrangement could drive lawyers to push clients to seek more in damages, and how
America’s healthcare system could induce more chronic pain sufferers to sue).
7. See id. at 17–18 (stating that Davis, J. and Prof. Hank Greely discussed how neuroscience,
neuroimaging, and in some cases, even secret surveillance can be factors in determining chronic
pain cases).
8. See id. at 6–8 (reporting that Prof. Hank Greely discussed the different kinds of chronic
pain legal claims and the various laws giving rise to those claims); see also, e.g., Report of the
Commission on the Evaluation of Pain, 50 SSA SOC. SECURITY BULL. 13, 14–15 (1987), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v50n1/v50n1p13.pdf (noting that since the early 1980s, an
increasing number of SSA cases have challenged the Social Security Administration’s policy on
the evaluation of pain).
9. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 18–19.
10. Id. at 21–22.
11. Id. at 22–24; see also Reverse Inference: Neuroscience’s Greatest Fallacy?, KNOWING
NEURONS
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://knowingneurons.com/2014/02/12/reverse-inferenceneurosciences-greatest-fallacy (explaining reverse inference as an epidemic of backwards
reasoning in which an observed brain activity is correlated to cognitive processes that are not
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of the broader issue that brain scans are not self interpreting and have no
self evident meaning, unlike, for example, an x-ray of a broken bone. The
panel further discussed the similarities and differences between
neuroimaging evidence and some types of scientific evidence and visual
courtroom techniques that have become commonplace in the courtroom.12
Bringing the session to an end, the panelists and participants discussed
the future of neuroimaging in the courtroom and the types of research that
might be necessary to use neuroimaging as proof of pain.13 Overall, the
panel ended on a cautiously optimistic note of taking pain neuroimaging
evidence to the courtroom.
II.

WHAT IS CHRONIC PAIN?

In order for scientists and legal actors to begin a meaningful dialogue
on pain and the law, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how
each field views chronic pain.
A.

Definitions

Pain, as defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain
(“IASP”), is “[a]n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such
damage.”14 The IASP further declares that pain is always subjective and
can be experienced in the absence of a physical stimulus.15
The generally accepted definition of chronic pain is pain that persists
for an extended period of time (typically greater than three months), or
persisting beyond the normal time of healing for a particular injury.16 There
is no single definition of chronic pain, however, that captures all pain
conditions, owing to the many possible sources and manifestations of these
disorders. For example, in neuropathic pain (such as with carpal tunnel
syndrome), pain arises as a direct consequence of “a lesion or disease
actually tested, but rather linked through research implicating a particular brain area with a
particular cognitive process).
12. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25–26.
13. Id. at 26–27.
14. IASP Taxonomy, INT'L ASS’N FOR STUDY OF PAIN (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.iasppain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1698#Peripheralneuropathicpain.
15. Id.
16. See Chronic Pain: Symptoms, Diagnosis, & Treatment, NAT'L INST. HEALTH
MEDLINEPLUS,
Spring
2011,
at
5,
5–6,
available
at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/magazine/issues/spring11/articles/spring11pg5-6.html
(defining chronic pain as pain that persists for longer than 12 weeks).

210

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 18:207

[affecting] the somatosensory nervous system,”17 whereas inflammatory
pain (such as with rheumatoid arthritis) is a type of pain that arises from
activation of nociceptors (neurons that are responsive to noxious stimuli).18
A third type of chronic pain disorder is sometimes referred to as functional
pain disorders, which typically includes irritable bowel syndrome, chronic
low back pain, and fibromyalgia, among others, and is characterized by pain
in the absence of a clear physical cause and is often associated with anxiety
and mood disturbance.19 Note that as the mechanisms of a pain disorder are
uncovered through research, classification of the disorder might change.
B.

Pain Classifications

Whether a chronic pain disorder falls into the neuropathic,
inflammatory, or functional category, hypersensitivity (sometimes called
allodynia or hyperalgesia)20 via peripheral and central sensitization is
usually present.21 At the brain level, the long-term consequences of either
type of pain might affect sensory, cognitive, and emotional circuits.22 These
brain changes can be detected with neuroimaging methods, and in
17. IASP Taxonomy, supra note 14.
18. See
Types
of
Pain,
DEP’T
PAIN
MED.
&
PALLIATIVE
CARE,
http://www.stoppain.org/pcd/content/addiction/nociceptive.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (stating
that rheumatoid arthritis is a type of inflammatory pain caused by the activation of pain receptors
on the surface level of the body).
19. See Fânia Cristina Santos et al., Síndrome de amplificação dolorosa no idoso. Relato de
caso e revisão da literature [Pain Amplification Syndrome in the Elderly. Case Report and
Literature Review] 13 Rev DOR. SÃU PAULO 175, 177 (2012) (Spain), available at
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rdor/v13n2/en_15.pdf (stating that functional pain syndromes include
chronic pain, where the symptoms may have no organic cause at all).
20. Joel Greenspan, Adam Kolber, & Michael Pardo, Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds:
Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 2: “’Excess’ Pain, Hyperalgesia, and
the Variability of Subjective Experience” 8 (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 2] (transcript on file
with the editors) (explaining that “hyperalgesia” is pain that is produced by stimulation that is
experienced at a higher pain level than would normally be associated with that stimulation).
21. See Jeffery Norris, World of Chronic Pain Suddenly Looks Different to Researchers,
UNIV. CAL. S.F. (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2009/11/8209/chronic-painhypersensitivity-nerve-pathways-use-vglut3-and-opioid-receptor (stating that chronic pain due to
hypersensitivity is common); see also Clifford J. Woolf, Pain Hypersensitivity, THE WELLCOME
TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/science4.html (last visited March 5, 2015)
(stating that two mechanisms involved with hypersensitivity are central sensitization and
peripheral sensitization).
22. See Karen D. Davis & Massieh Moayedi, Central Mechanisms of Pain Revealed Through
Functional and Structural MRI, 8 J. NEUROIMMUNE PHARMACOLOGY 518, 518 (2013), available
at
http://www.pain.anes.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/central%20mechanisms%20of%20pain%20review
.pdf (stating that brain structure is not static and can adapt to prolonged nociceptive input and
pain, and may often be the cause of chronic pain).
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particular, the emphasis in this field has been on functional and structural
MRIs.23 The most consistent findings across chronic pain disorders
conclude that patients have decreased gray matter volume and increased
activation during evoked pain and cognitive and emotional tasks compared
to the control group.24 While to date, there have been no clear
demonstrations that these brain changes could be used as objective
biomarkers for chronic pain, the aggregate findings suggest that pain is a
disease of the brain,25 and that with recent advances in neuroimaging
technology and analysis techniques, the possibility of using these scans as
objective biomarkers is becoming a near reality.26
C.

The Trouble With Pain in Legal Settings

For scientific and medical communities, the rather open-ended
definitions of pain generally work. Pain is the number one reason that a
person will seek medical attention.27 For the caregiver, except in a very
small number of cases, there is no reason to question a patient’s complaint,
and the caregiver and the patient will work together toward the common
goal of relieving pain. In the legal system, the opposing goals of the
claimant and the defense pose problems for conditions that can only be
subjectively validated. As Professor Greely commented about pain in the
legal system, “we know that there are people who lie, [and] we know there
23. See Karen D. Davis & Massieh Moayedi, Central Mechanisms of Pain Revealed Through
Functional and Structural MRI, 8 J. NEUROIMMUNE PHARMACOLOGY 518, 520 (2013), available
at
http://www.pain.anes.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/central%20mechanisms%20of%20pain%20review
.pdf (stating that neuroimaging technologies, specifically functional and structural MRIs, can be
used to detect brain responses, gray matter volume, functional connectivity, and neuronal activity
in the brain).
24. See id. at 529 (stating that when comparing healthy controls versus patients with chronic
pain, fMRIs of patients with chronic pain showed heightened emotional responses during periods
of evoked pain when trying to balance pain and emotionally challenging tasks).
25. See David Borsook, Neurological Diseases and Pain, 135 BRAIN 320, 320 (2012),
available at http://brain.oxfordjournals.org/content/brain/135/2/320.full.pdf (“More recently,
clinicians and researchers have come to the conclusion that, in many cases, chronic pain is a direct
result of the neurological disease, or may even be considered an integral part of the underlying
disease.”).
26. See Davis & Moayedi, supra note 23, at 530 (“[K]nowledge gained from fundamental
neuroimaging studies of pain may provide insight into biomarkers of chronic pain and the optimal
time to intervene with treatment and also can provide insight into potential side effects of
treatment . . . .”). Currently, this is limited to predicting acute pain in healthy subjects, but the field
is advancing in the direction of using the scans of both healthy people and those with chronic pain.
Id. at 518.
27. Pain,
NAT’L CTR. FOR COMPLEMENTARY & INTEGRATIVE HEALTH,
https://nccih.nih.gov/health/pain (last modified Jan. 27, 2015).
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are people who exaggerate . . . . The legal system needs some kind of
evidence to help it evaluate whether somebody is in pain, whether they’re
exaggerating the pain, [or] whether they’re lying about it.”28 This problem
is not peculiar to pain disorders: as Judge Davis observed, “the law has long
struggled to satisfy itself that it can do a good job of separating the bogus,
exaggerated claims from the legitimate claims.”29 But separating legitimate
from bogus claims may be more difficult (or may be perceived by decision
makers as more difficult) in cases involving pain because of pain’s nature
as invisible, subjective, and unquantifiable.
Thus, the dilemma that the panel faced was what—if anything—could
the current and near future state of neuroimaging research provide the legal
system in terms of evidence. In American tort law, the goal is to “quantify,
identify, legitimize, and compensate people who are suffering from the
negligence of others.”30 Thus, in most cases where pain and suffering are
concerned, not only is there a requirement to demonstrate that the pain is
real, but there is the requirement to show that it was the result of a
particular incident.31 In most administrative law settings, as in the Social
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) regime and in workers’
compensation regimes, the problems of causation are absent; the individual
claiming disability benefits (called “the insured”) must demonstrate that his
or her pain is real and disabling, regardless of its external causes or internal
etiology.32 As Professor Davis notes, “nobody—and even people within the
pain scientific and medical community—can agree whether or not [chronic
pain is] a disease.”33
D.
Is Chronic Pain a Disease?

28. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id; see also Stephen J. Shapiro, Overcoming Under-Compensation and Under-Deterrence
in International Tort Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?, 62 MERCER L.
REV. 449, 449 (2011) (stating that the widely recognized purpose of tort law is to compensate the
parties that are injured by the wrongdoings of others).
31. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981) (stating
that causation, or the cause and effect relationship of incident to injury, must be established before
liability can be imposed).
32. See Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) and Social Security Disability, SOCIAL
SECURITY
DISABILITY
HELP,
http://www.disability-benefits-help.org/disablingconditions/complex-regional-pain-syndrome (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (stating that the claimant
must establish a diagnosis of chronic pain and how chronic pain affects the claimant’s daily living
and work-related performance in order receive social security benefits for a chronic pain injury).
33. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 11.
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In a recent debate, scientists have questioned whether chronic pain is
best described as a “disease” in its own right. 34 The topic is contentious in
part because the definition of disease is somewhat ambiguous. Professor
Davis was in favor of classifying chronic pain as a disease and believed that
in doing so, it would only be beneficial for patients (as it has been for other
diseases),35 but stated that others in the field disagreed for various
reasons.36 A recent paper outlines the potential negative consequences of
labeling chronic pain as a disease based on neuroimaging studies, which
included: negative effects on (1) the therapeutic dialogue between clinicians
and patients; (2) the social dialogue about reimbursement for pain
treatments and disability due to pain; and (3) the chronic pain research
agenda.37 Professor Davis’s opinion on pain being classified as a disease in
terms of the legal outcomes was that “if a judge is told by the medical
community that this person has a disease, I think that [the lawyer’s] job
must be easier . . . .”38
Some have argued that neuroimaging evidence supports the idea that
chronic pain is a disease of the brain.39 If chronic pain leads to consistent
alterations in brain structure and activity, then presumably this position
would hold. Since chronic pain can have multiple causes and diverse
comorbid clinical manifestations, it is yet unclear whether such a consistent
pattern would be attainable.
While the definitions of pain and chronic pain are generally clear to
the scientific and medical fields, they remain—intentionally—quite open to
interpretation. The subjective nature of pain means that no two people will

34. See Mark D. Sullivan et al., What Does it Mean to Call Chronic Pain a Brain Disease, 14
J. PAIN 317, 318 (2013) (stating that classifying chronic pain as a disease may have negative
effects on therapeutic and social dialogues, as well as chronic pain research); Karen D. Davis, Is
Chronic Pain a Disease? Evaluating Pain and Nociception Through Self-Report and
Neuroimaging, 14 J. PAIN 332, 332 (2013) (noting that political issues should not detract from the
scientific and medical evidence that suggest chronic pain should be considered a disease).
35. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 11. See also Davis, supra note 34, at 332 (suggesting that
classifying chronic pain as a disease will promote an open dialogue and “improve patient and
physician attitudes, public understanding and caring, as well as research efforts and funding”).
Judge Davis noted that labeling substance abuse and alcoholism diseases (in the DSM) was a good
thing for the law and for society. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 14.
36. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 14. See also Davis, supra note 34, at 332 (stating that others
argue that there is a need for “whole body pathology” and “first-person complaints”); Sullivan et
al., supra note 34 (arguing that “chronic pain” may fail to attain disease status due to a negative
effect on the doctor-patient therapeutic dialogue, the social dialogue regarding reimbursement for
pain treatments, and the chronic pain research agenda).
37. Sullivan et al., supra note 34.
38. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 15.
39. See, e.g., David Borsook et al., The Pain Imaging Revolution: Advancing Pain into the
21st Century, 16 NEUROSCIENTIST 171, 173 (2010).
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necessarily share identical pain experiences following a common injury.40
Not only that, but the recovery from an injury in one person might be rapid
and complete, with no residual pain, while in another person who suffered
the same injury, despite having appeared to be healed, the pain would
persist.41 The potential physiological, psychological, and genetic factors for
such individual variability are numerous.42 This leaves the legal decision
makers to evaluate the claimant’s subjective account of pain along with
various forms of conflicting or corroborating medical evidence, but without
the possibility of objective proof of the degree of pain or pain related
disability. How does neuroimaging inform our understanding of why
chronic pain occurs?
E.

Neuroimaging of Chronic Pain

One of the reasons that neuroimaging is useful in informing our
understanding of chronic pain is the familiarity that the general public has
with the field. Many people have seen the popular press descriptions of how
activity in some brain region is associated with a certain behavior, or more
recently, how your brain changes with learning, development, or in disease
states.43
Professor Davis noted that in general, pain researchers are using
neuroimaging to discover how chronic pain alters brain function and
structure.44 Many studies have provided substantial evidence of consistent
brain functional and structural changes in chronic pain disorders, including

40. See Tetsuo Koyama et al., The Subjective Experience of Pain: Where Expectations
Become Reality, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12950, 12950 (2005) (stating that sensory
events are highly subjective and vary by the individual).
41. See Marieke Jepma et al., The Dynamics of Pain: Evidence for Simultaneous Site-Specific
Habituation and Site-Nonspecific Sensitization in Thermal Pain, 15 J. PAIN 734, 742–44 (2014)
(describing how variability in pain outcomes may be attributed to several factors). A good
example of this is post-thoracotomy chronic pain, which about 50 percent of patients develop.
Despite it being a common and fairly standardized procedure with little variability in surgical
healing, there is considerable variability in the pain related outcomes of the surgery. Emine Ozgur
Bayman & Timothy J. Brennan, Incidence and Severity of Chronic Pain at 3 and 6 Months After
Thoracotomy: Meta-Analysis, 15 J. PAIN 887, 887 (2014).
42. See Luda Diatchenko et al., Idiopathic Pain Disorders–Pathways of Vulnerability, 123 J.
PAIN 226, 229 (2006) (explaining factors that can be attributed to variation in pain outcomes).
43. See Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Margot J. Taylor, A Developmental Framework of Brain and
Cognition from Infancy to Old Age, 24 BRAIN TOPOGRAPHY 183, 183 (2011) (explaining how the
human brain remains malleable, changing throughout life even after childhood development).
44. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 4.
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functional pain disorders, fibromyalgia, irritable bowel disorder, and
temporomandibular joint disorder.45
Perhaps a bigger question is whether we will be able to predict
someone’s pain with neuroimaging techniques. This work can rely on
functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”), but also upon other
neuroimaging techniques, like Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”) and
MRI spectroscopy (“MRS”), which provide readouts of neurotransmitter
binding and chemical systems in the brain and can provide a more “refined
look at what might be wrong during chronic pain.”46
F.

Limitations of Pain Neuroimaging

There are also important limitations to our understanding of chronic
pain. Despite the wealth of recent knowledge gains, major questions about
the mechanisms of chronic pain remain. Professor Davis described the noncompatibility of two existing theories, each of which have support from
multiple lines of research: in one theory (the “specificity theory”),
individual neuronal pathways are specifically tuned to a percept, such as
pain; the other theory (the “pattern theory”) takes an integrative view,
which is that there is no single cell or pathway responsible for pain, but
rather pain is an integration of inputs that lead to cognitive, emotional, and
sensory responses.47 The field generally accepts some middle ground.48
Functional neuroimaging research on acute pain has determined that certain
brain regions are reliably activated by painful stimuli.49 Chronic pain
research similarly finds differences in structure and function in predictable
regions of the brain (although with considerably more variability than in

45. See, e.g., David A. Seminowicz et al., Regional Gray Matter Density Changes in Brains
of Patients with Irritable Bowel Syndrome, 139 GASTROENTEROLOGY 48, 48–49 (2010) (giving
examples of consistent structural and functional changes in the brain associated with chronic pain
disorders).
46. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 11–12. See also CAROLYN ASBURY, THE DANA FOUND., BRAIN
IMAGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS IN NEUROSCIENCE 38–43 (2011),
https://www.legalbluebook.com/R-18-2-1 (describing neuroimaging techniques such as functional
magnetic resonance imaging, Positron Emission Tomography, and MRI spectroscopy).
47. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 12. See also Ronald Melzack & Patrick D. Wall, Pain
Mechanisms: A New Theory, 150 SCIENCE 971, 971 (1965) (explaining the definitions of
“specificity theory” and “pattern theory”).
48. See Massieh Moayedi & Karen D. Davis, Theories of Pain: From Specificity to Gate
Control, 109 J NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 5, 10 (2013) (describing how components of several theories
of the brain and pain are currently used, creating a multidimensional approach).
49. See R. Christopher deCharms et al., Control over Brain Activation and Pain Learned by
Using Real-Time Functional MRI, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 18626, 18626 (2005)
(reporting on studies regarding brain activity in response to pain).
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studies of acute pain).50 But in the absence of a coherent theory of the brain
(specificity theory, pattern theory, or some as-yet-undeveloped theory), the
full meaning of these findings remains unclear.
As a second example of how our understanding of brain circuits in
chronic pain is limited, Professor Davis noted that in a fMRI, the smallest
unit that one can examine is “comprised of tens of thousands of cells.”51 In
other words, with non-invasive neuroimaging technology, our measurement
units (or voxels) represent “a mixed response that integrates everything
going on in that little chunk of the brain.”52 To date, no brain region, group
of regions, or network has been found to be specific to pain. Pain is a
complex experience, having sensory, emotional, and cognitive components,
and any activation observed in response to pain could be a representation of
one or a combination of these components.
The specificity theory vs. pattern theory and the problems with
interpreting pain neuroimaging data are just two examples of where our
understanding of brain circuitry involved in chronic pain is limited. There is
still much active research in this area, and pain will not be understood
completely in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, significant progress has
been made in our understanding of pain that could inform the legal system,
at least imparting the knowledge that chronic pain changes the brain in a
manner comparable to other recognized neurological and psychiatric
disorders.53
III.

THE PRICE OF PAIN: WHAT ARE THE MOTIVES FOR CLAIMING PAIN?

One of the biggest differences that the panelists identified between the
legal and medical systems that deal with pain and pain evidence is that
participants in the legal system were much more likely to have “skin in the
game.”54 While it is possible for doctors to have a stake in their
diagnoses,55 it is much more common for a lawyer (in a contingent fee

50. See Ulrike Friebel et al., Coordinate-Based Meta-Analysis of Experimentally Induced and
Chronic Persistent Neuropathic Pain, 58 NEUROIMAGE 1070, 1073–74 (2011) (explaining brain
function in pain studies).
51. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that there is a lack of empirical data to show how pain
is received at the second- and third-order neurons in the central nervous system).
52. Id. at 12.
53. See Pascual-Leone & Taylor, supra note 43 (explaining how the pain leads to brain
changes).
54. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 13 (referring to “skin in the game” as an investment in the
outcome).
55. For example, a doctor who prescribes controlled painkillers to someone who was faking
the need could possibly face professional discipline, lose her Drug Enforcement Administration
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arrangement, for example) to have a stake in the outcome of a trial.56 The
panel concluded that while this could be a good thing, even at the best of
times, the situation requires monitoring.57 But the party with perhaps the
most skin in the game is the party making a claim for having pain.58
Features of legal regimes can themselves have a distorting effect,
inducing claimants to present themselves as more impaired than they are
and even, paradoxically, causing claimants to experience greater levels of
actual disability.59 Professor Davis described how certain legal regimes can
have a physiologically disabling effect on their intended beneficiaries.60
She recounted being told by arthritic patients that they were physically
capable of being productive for a few of hours a day—but that they had to
avoid being active because their insurers did not offer part time disability
claims.61 She reported hearing: “If I go out and I try to be a good citizen, try
to do some things, try to work a bit a couple hours a day, I see people taking
pictures of me. But by noon, I’ve had it. So I’m sitting now, in my house,
getting worse, not moving forward, because otherwise they don’t believe
me.”62
Judge Davis echoed a similar point, noting that if someone brought
suit against certain large companies, they “can be pretty sure that, at various
times over the next eighteen to thirty six months, there will be somebody
near [them] with a camera, recording.”63 These intrusions can force
claimants to stagnate their recoveries while they try to move forward with
their claims, leaving them unable to even try to improve for fear that the
other side will catch them doing something active, even just once.64 The
license, or even be on the hook criminally. See David W. Feeder, II, When Your Doctor Says,
"You Have Nothing to Worry About," Don't Be So Sure: The Effect of Fabio v. Bellomo on
Medical Malpractice Actions in Minnesota, 78 MINN. L. REV. 943, 945–46 (1994) (explaining that
physicians may be held liable in tort for malpractice when their patients sustain injuries under
their care in cases like physician failure or omission in diagnosis).
56. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 17.
57. Id.
58. See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 87 (2006)
(stating that pain and suffering awards make up 50 percent of total awards).
59. See id. at 115 (explaining why plaintiffs may “behave strategically” by exaggerating pain
to increase medical costs for a larger monetary award).
60. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 19 (describing the negative consequences associated with
plaintiff surveillance).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 18.
64. See William A. Chittenden III et al., Recent Developments in Health Insurance, Life
Insurance, and Disability Insurance Case Law, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 233, 243–44
(2013) (giving examples of video surveillance used in disability and injury claims).
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fear is that a jury (or insurance company) will then assume that the claimant
is out all the time, being much more active than claimed.65
IV.

WHAT KINDS OF LEGAL CLAIMS RELATING TO CHRONIC PAIN ARE
MOST COMMON AND SIGNIFICANT?

Professor Greely, Judge Davis, and, from the audience, Judge Nancy
Gertner, discussed the ways in which claims involving chronic pain come
before the legal system. Professor Greely first presented a functional
grouping of claims involving pain.66 He described three general categories
of pain related claims that may arise in a variety of legal contexts.67 A
spirited discussion amongst the legal participants ensued, concerning the
difficulties that claims of each kind pose for legal decision makers.68 Then
Professor Greely, Judges Davis, and Judge Gertner described the specific
legal regimes under which claims involving chronic pain arise, and certain
evidentiary and institutional concerns particular to each setting.69
A.

Three Kinds of Pain Claims and the Issues They Present

The first category that Professor Greely defined involves claims for
economic loss.70 Such claims take the form of an assertion by the claimant
who says something like “[because] [t]he pain is so bad . . . there are . . .
economically rewarding things[] that I cannot do . . . .”71 These claims,
Professor Greely noted, can be brought in various bodies of law.72 A
claimant might seek compensation for the loss of ability to work from state
or federal government disability insurance schemes, from a private insurer
pursuant to ERISA,73 or in tort if the pain and resulting economic losses

65. See id. (showing instances where courts allowed video surveillance as a consideration of
whether or not the plaintiff was disabled); see also Panel 1, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that one
controversial “gold standard” of determining a plaintiff’s disability is secret surveillance).
66. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 7–8.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 8–10 (starting a discussion about the problems of evidence issues and
calculating the value that pain and suffering poses for the legal system).
69. Id. at 8–10, 25–26.
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).
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result from alleged negligence.74 He noted that claims for economic loss are
the most common form used in claims relating to pain.75
The second category of pain related claims that Professor Greely
described involves claims for “particular medical services, or rehabilitative
services, or other services” related to managing the claimant’s pain
condition.76 Such claims can arise after an insurer has denied coverage for
such services because it has determined that the claimant does not really
need these because the person is not “truly in pain,” or because these
services that are not the sorts of things that are medically accepted as being
useful based on the claimant’s diagnosis, or because an insurer interprets
the services to fall outside of the scope of the insured’s’ coverages.77
Professor Greely commented that cases like these probably “come up a lot,”
but that it is hard to know; such cases fly “under the radar” because they are
likely to settle.78 Claims that take this form may arise in several legal
contexts, including ERISA and civil suits in contracts against private
insurers.79
The third category, and, in Professor Greely’s view, perhaps the
hardest to adjudicate, involves claims for the non-economic damages
related to pain—that is, compensation for various forms of suffering.80
Such compensation is for “the pain they suffer every day as a result of the
injury” and its non-economic impact on their lives.81 Many losses related to
chronic pain, particularly if the pain is severe, are real but hard to quantify:
these losses relate to what it means to experience the self or to live a fully
realized life.82 Chronic pain changes cognition and mood, meaning that a
person in chronic pain inhabits a somewhat different self and mind than he
or she did prior to the pain condition.83 Pain limits life activities, curtailing

74. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 1, 7.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., id. (explaining that in the United States, many people receive health coverage
through their employees, and that relationship is governed by ERISA).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See generally Sandra H. Johnson, Knox Todd, & Benjamin W. Moulton, Chronic Pain
and Health Communities: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Issues in Improving the Public’s Health, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 4, 70 (2007) (noting that the effects of chronic pain
include work incapacity, increase in consumption of health care resources, the diminished chance
of a healthy lifestyle due to the inability to do physical exercise, and the increased risk of
depression).
83. Sigrid Fry-Revere & Elizabeth K. Do, Chronic Problem: Pain Management of NonCancer Pain in America, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 193 (2013) (explaining that pain creates
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opportunities to engage in meaningful experiences.84 Severe chronic pain
(and its medication regime) could be incompatible with pregnancy and
child rearing, excelling in one’s career, travel, or with taking a walk on a
beautiful day. Such damages for the claimant’s suffering (sometimes also
termed “hedonic” losses)85 are “different from the fact that they’re not
going to be able to work . . . . So how do we evaluate that?”86 This category
of claims for damages arises only in tort, as disability insurance regimes do
not provide additional compensation for such real but inchoate losses.87
Judge Davis commented on the difficulty in evaluating this third
category of pain related claims and losses, recalling a case he presided over
when he was sitting on the state court in Baltimore.88 The case involved a
tort claim brought by an older man with early stage Parkinson’s disease
who fell and injured himself as a result of the defendant’s negligence.89 The
Judge recalled that the plaintiff and his wife were “lovely” and
sympathetic.90 The jury issued a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor along with a
very large damages award, and the defendant moved to reduce the
damages.91 Sufficient evidence supported the verdict but not the size of the
damages award, so the Judge “had to reduce the award in this case.”92 This
is an example, he said, of where “the law does permit a judge, after the jury
has made a decision to quantify pain and suffering, to reduce that award,”
via a “‘remittitur’ of the amount of damages.”93
The problem, Judge Davis explained, is “[h]ow do I, as a judge, do the
remittitur? If I’m absolutely convinced that the jury has been too generous
and acted arbitrarily or on the basis of improper factors in making an award,
debilitating effects that erode an individual’s quality of life with physical and emotional
consequences).
84. Johnson, Todd, & Moulton, supra note 82.
85. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (8th ed. 2007) (“Damages that attempt to
compensate for the loss of the pleasure of being alive.”); see also Hedonic Damages Law & Legal
Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/h/hedonic-damages/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2015) (noting that there is no objective measurement for the value of human life).
86. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 7.
87. See id. (noting that the Social Security Disability Act (“SSDA”) did not permit claims
based on pain until 1984, and that the SSDA still limits claims based on pain if and only if it is the
symptom of some objective medical condition the claimant can point to).
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Remittitur is “[a]n order awarding a new trial, or a damages amount lower than that
awarded by the jury, and requiring the plaintiff to choose between those alternatives[; or] . . . The
process by which a court requires either that the case be retried, or that the damages awarded by
the jury be reduced.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 1321.
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how am I, as a judge, [supposed] to recalibrate that? Because frankly, [I
may be] no better than a jury in doing so.”94 He suggested that the judges
tend to ask themselves, “‘what’s fair?’ [W]hatever that means.” The second
question a judge might ask him or herself is a more pragmatic one about
how much can be awarded versus what is “[left] on the table . . . that ‘sweet
spot’ [where] everybody is unhappy, but it’ll stand up on appeal.”95
The pragmatic and institutional considerations that Judge Davis
identifies here will no doubt remain regardless of future techniques for
evaluating pain and suffering. He also noted, “the law may be a long way
from getting the kind of help from science for these kinds of problems.”96
But, he said, “hope springs eternal”97 that improved understandings of the
reality of chronic pain and of its specific effects on people suffering from
such conditions will help jurors and judges to come to more informed and
specific valuations of the appropriate damages in any particular case.98
Better information could help judges and jurors move beyond factors like
likeability (or lack thereof), as well as inform their gut sense of “what’s
fair?”99
Building on Judge Davis’ comments, Professor Greely noted an
additional difficulty in valuing these kinds of cases: a jury (or, in some
cases, a judge) must put a value on the claim at one point in time—the time
of the verdict.100 Yet the claimant may change greatly over time, for better
or for worse, which can lead to the one time award being excessively high
or low.101

94. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 9. Judge Morris Hoffman expressed a similar sentiment on Panel
2. See Panel 2, supra note 20, at 11 (“[Judges] suffer this problem of getting deadened to the
process.”). This may reflect accurate self-assessment or judicial modesty. It would be interesting
to gather data on how judges and jurors, respectively, evaluate pain and suffering damages based
on the same evidence.
95. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 9.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Natalie Salmanowitz, The Case for Pain Neuroimaging in the Courtroom: Lessons from
Deception Detection, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 139, 144–45 (2015), available at
http://jlb.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/1/139.full.pdf+html (arguing for the use of fMRI to detect
the validity of pain in tort cases).
100. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10 (noting the difficulty that courts have in determining
whether the claimant is really feeling pain based on the claimant’s self report).
101. See id. (emphasizing that self assessments are dangerous because it is difficult to know if
and how much a complainant may be exaggerating and changing their self assessments).
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The Legal Regimes or Contexts in Which These Kinds of Claims Arise

Pain related claims that fall into the three categories mentioned above
arise in various legal contexts. Professor Greely remarked that such claims
“come up in tort suits at the state and federal level, . . . come up enormously
in administrative procedures for disability payment—the Social Security
Administration has literally hundreds of thousands of these—and they’ll
come up in other occasional, strange contexts, like [when] seeking medical
benefits.”102 Whether “a pain claim is being made in a court proceeding or
an administrative proceeding can make a huge difference in terms of what
evidence can get in and how it gets weighted, and what sorts of processes it
goes through.”103 Professor Greely also cautioned that it is easy to
overemphasize what happens during adjudication of a claim.104 Instead, we
must keep in mind that “90 plus percent of cases get resolved” through
settlement.105 In these cases, judges or juries’ thoughts of pain disorders, or
the issue of what neuroimaging [information] could perhaps be admitted
(subject to Daubert)106 does not become an explicit issue. Instead, the
majority of resolutions in such cases consist of “bargaining in the shadow
of the law.”107
1.

State and federal tort claims

In a tort claim in a state or federal court, “the scientific evidence gets
examined, at least in theory, very closely.”108 Judge Davis and Professor
102. Id. at 7.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. (noting that the adjudication of these claims are rare as many settle before trial).
105. Id.; see also James Herby, Pre-trial Settlement Percentage: Statistics on Personal Injury
Settlements, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/article/pre-trial-settlementpercentage-statistics-on-personal-injury-settlements/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (noting that 90
percent of personal injury cases are settled pretrial).
106. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Supreme Court,
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence governing the admissibility of expert evidence, held
that the trial judge should independently evaluate the expert evidence based on factors that include
whether or not it is the product of scientific methodology (particularly whether the technique or
theory is falsifiable), whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, has a known or
potential error rate, and the degree to which the theory or technique is generally accepted in the
relevant expert community. Id. at 594 (interpreting FED. R. EVID. 702). Not all states have adopted
this standard. See MARTIN S. KAUFMAN, ATL. LEGAL FOUND., THE STATUS OF DAUBERT IN
STATE COURTS 1–3 (2006), http://www.atlanticlegal.org/daubertreport.pdf (noting that 13 states
and D.C. have rejected the standard, and 7 states have neither accepted nor rejected the standard).
107. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 8.
108. See id. at 7 (explaining that the evidence must go through the judge, which is then again
examined by the jury).
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Greely both described the Daubert standard for the admissibility of
scientific or other expert evidence, which applies in federal courts and the
majority of state courts.109 Under both Daubert and the Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, the judge is tasked with acting as a “gatekeeper” to
determine whether the proffered expert evidence is sufficiently reliable and
whether it will be helpful to the jury.110 Jurors are then supposed to
carefully evaluate admitted evidence in light of the judge’s instructions,
which is a task that may be a great deal to ask of any juror.111
Judge Gertner expressed further skepticism about the expectations that
Daubert imposes on jurors, and explained particular reservations she had
about the impact of the adversary process on pain based claims.112 She
described her experience as a district judge, which made her “less sanguine”
about the ability of jurors to interpret sophisticated expert evidence.113
Often, she remarked, it comes down to the level of the parties’ resources.114
Daubert and the Federal Rules provide “a very flawed, flexible standard,
and then we bury everything by giving it to a jury, and the jury doesn’t
necessarily give a reason [for their decision].”115 Further, the adversary
process creates an “atmosphere of skepticism.”116 Yet, she noted that the
“law is already so skeptical about pain and suffering. So how is that going
to play out? And what I fear is that you’re going to have cases that will over
weigh it, and cases that will under weigh it.”117
2.

ERISA

Cases may also come into federal court pursuant to the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), which governs the
relationship between employees and employer provided benefits such as

109. Id. at 5–7.
110. See id. at 7–8; see also Cassandra H. Welch, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review:
Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1090 (2006) (discussing the
effect of Rule 702 and Daubert on the judge’s role as gatekeeper in assisting the jury as the jury
deciphers scientific and other types of knowledge).
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 25. For a detailed discussion of the evidentiary process and considerations relating
to neuroscientific evidence, see Panel 2, supra note 20 at 12–13.
113. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25.
114. Id.
115. Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96 (1993) (discussing
how the jury is charged with determining the validity of what scientific evidence is believable).
116. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25.
117. Id. at 25–26.
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health insurance and, in some cases, disability insurance.118 Judge Davis
noted that just about all people employed in the United States who have
employer sponsored health plans are covered by ERISA.119 In an ERISA
action, a claimant may allege that an insurer inappropriately denied
coverage for needed services or denied a claim for short- or long-term
disability.120 In these matters, federal courts do not receive evidence (e.g.,
expert witness testimony), but rather review whether the insurance company
made an appropriate, non-arbitrary decision pursuant to the terms of the
insurance plan.121 Professor Greely noted that it is “very, very hard for a
claimant to win an ERISA claim” because of the deferential standard with
which courts must review a plan’s determination.122
Judge Davis noted that the court on which he sits, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, recently issued a significant
opinion in Cosey v. Prudential Insurance Company of America123 that
concerned ERISA, which involved a “a white collar worker with a senior
and responsible position . . . who started to have chronic, largely
unexplained pain” that she alleged disabled her from working.124 The
worker filed a claim for short term disability that her insurer initially
approved; the insurer later withdrew its approval.125 Under ERISA, Judge
Davis noted, “the companies have an awful lot of authority. They actually
have the authority to say ‘we will decide who is disabled.’”126 In this case,
the insurer contended that it had discretion to find that the claimant was not
disabled because she had not come forward with objective evidence of her
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (stating that ERISA was intended to govern the relationship
between employees and employer provided health insurance benefit plans).
119. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6. See also William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Preemption: Implications for Health Reform and Coverage, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Feb. 2008, at 1, 11,
available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_02a-20082.pdf (stating that 82 percent of
people covered by employment-based health benefits fall under ERISA plans).
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012) (stating that a civil action may be brought by a policy holder
to recover benefits due to them).
121. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115 (2008) (discussing the standard of
care for insurance plan administrators and the judicial review under ERISA for failing to meet that
standard.); see also id. at 118 (noting that the Court heard medical testimony gathered and
supplied by the insurance company rather than testimony from a medical expert).
122. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 7; see also Sarah L. Whipple, Piercing ERISA’s Shield of
Immunity: The First Step—Saving External Review Laws from ERISA Preemption—Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and the Massachusetts Act Relative to Managed Care Practices in
Insurance Industry, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 863, 896 (2003) (noting the various challenges to a
successful ERISA claim).
123. 735 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013).
124. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 19; see also Cosey, 735 F.3d at 163.
125. Cosey, 735 F.3d at 163.
126. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6. See also Glenn, 554 U.S. at 108 (discussing the discretionary
authority of insurance companies in determining valid claims).
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pain based disability.127 What Cosey holds, according to Judge Davis, “is
that for chronic pain type claims, objective evidence is not a sine qua non”
of a disability finding.128 In Judge Davis’ view, this holding could be “very
significant” for individuals with chronic pain.129
3.

Administrative adjudication and appeals

A majority of pain related claims are heard in administrative
settings.130 These include state administrative proceedings that adjudicate
workers’ compensation cases and federal administrative settings that
adjudicate SSDI disability claims.131 In these administrative proceedings,
Professor Greely noted that the context of proof is sharply different: “the
rules of evidence are slacker, and in some cases close to non-existent, and
there is no jury, and there are no instructions.”132 Compared to federal and
state courts, there often may not be “the same level of written opinions and
precedent—it varies from system to system, but it’s a very different kind of
world.”133 These cases can eventually proceed on appeal into a state or
federal court where state or federal judges (without the aid of a jury) may
review the determination made by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).134
This standard of review is less deferential than in ERISA cases, and judges
frequently may comb the record to evaluate independently whether the
denied claim appears meritorious.135
The role of the ALJ as an ultimate decision maker in administrative
courts and in state and federal review of ERISA and administrative claims
means that these ALJs are vested with tremendous authority relative to

127. Cosey, 735 F.3d at 164 (discussing how the insurer concluded there was a lack of medical
evidence to conclude that Cosey had a disability).
128. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6; see also Cosey, 735 F.3d at 163 (holding that objective proof
is not necessary for a disability claim).
129. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 6.
130. See, e.g., EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., FAQs About The Benefit Claims Procedure
Regulation, U.S. DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_claims_proc_reg.html (last
visited Mar. 8, 2015) (discussing how ERISA claims must first go through administrative
process).
131. Id.
132. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 8.
133. Id.
134. For example, in Maryland, an unsatisfied party may request that “any question of fact
involved in the case” be submitted to a jury, which essentially affords claimants (and employers)
an opportunity to retry the case in front of a jury. MD. LAB. & EMPL. CODE ANN. § 9-745(d)
(2014). There is also a more traditional review option, where the Circuit Court merely examines
the Commission’s decision in light of the facts already gathered. § 9-745(c).
135. See § 9-745 (noting the different standards of review as compared to ERISA cases).
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claims involving chronic pain.136 The ways in which these ALJs review and
evaluate the parties’ evidence is not bounded by Daubert (as it would be in
the trial context), which proves that ALJs are the crucial decision makers in
interpreting and applying the law relative to evidence of chronic pain.137
Their understandings and beliefs about what kinds of chronic pain claims
seem credible and what types of evidence tend to substantiate a claim of
chronic pain may be the most important across the three types of cases that
Professor Greely described, and across all of the legal contexts in which
those types of cases may arise.
V.

COULD PAIN NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE BE USED IN COURT?

Aside from pain neuroimaging studies informing legal systems
through aggregate findings, there is also the potential for the fMRI to
“decode” a person’s experience.138 In an ideal materialization of this
decoding for pain, a person would simply go into a scanner and the readout
would tell you if she were experiencing pain.139 While the technology
might not be available today, there was general agreement that it could
arrive in the foreseeable future for decoding acute pain, and eventually it
could possibly be able to decode chronic pain.140 There are several
limitations to this approach that will need to be addressed. Professor Davis
pointed out some of these limitations, and Professor Greely shared his
views on the nature of those limitations in a legal setting.141
A particular problem in decoding a person’s brain activity to see if s/he
is in pain is known as the “reverse inference” problem.142 Professor Davis
described the problem through an example:
136. See e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 109 (2008) (noting the role of the
administrative law judge in determining issues of fact in ERISA claims); Papendick v. Sullivan,
969 F.2d 298, 701 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court’s role is to only review the administrative
law judge’s decision for substantial evidence, which may be less than a preponderance of
evidence).
137. Compare Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 701 (stating that the role of the court is to review the
administrative law judge’s decision for substantial evidence), with Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (discussing how even though the judge plays the role of
“gatekeeper,” the jury is charged with determining the validity of scientific evidence).
138. See Stephen M. LaConte, Decoding fMRI Brain States in Real-Time, 56 NEUROIMAGE
440, 440 (2011) (stating that fMRI data can be used to decode brain states).
139. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing how it would be easier to determine pain if a
scanner simply revealed whether a person was actually experiencing it).
140. Id. at 4, 11.
141. Id. at 23.
142. See NICHOLAS MACKINTOSH ET AL., THE ROYAL SOC’Y, BRAIN WAVES MODULE 4:
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW 6 (2011) (discussing the reverse inference problem in determining
the meaning of signals through existing imaging technology in the brain).
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if you deliver a painful stimulus, or if people are in pain,
you can definitely see certain kinds of signatures—pain
signatures—in the brain. But there are other things you
could do, [such as to] have somebody think about
something very salient, or all sorts of other things, that
actually will give you the exact same brain map, the same
response. The same areas of the brain are going to respond,
because the pain system shares resources—real estate—
with many of these other cognitive and emotional
systems.143
The essence of the reverse inference problem is that you cannot infer a
specific behavior just by looking at a brain pattern.144 An example of the
reverse inference problem is illustrated with spinal malformations and low
back pain. Often, spine imaging is used when a person complains of back
pain.145 In a case where a herniated disc, degenerative disc, or other
anomaly is identified, it is easy to assume that the pain is associated with
that anomaly. It turns out, however, that these same spinal anomalies are
very common in healthy, asymptomatic people.146 The imaging finding in
that case could be spurious and it should not guide the intervention
approach.
Professor Davis warned that even in the future, when machine learning
and similar technologies might be able to provide predictions of whether
someone is in pain, even with all of the proper controls and
countermeasures and with high (e.g., over 95 percent) accuracy and
specificity, there is still uncertainty; what will happen to those 5 percent of

143. See id. (discussing how reactions from one part of the brain does not necessarily
coordinate with any single particular emotion, feeling, or act).
144. Id. There are a few notable exceptions to this reverse inference problem, such as a paper
by Jack Gallant and colleagues describing a method to decode visual scenes from brain activity
recorded with fMRI. Jack Gallant et al., Encoding and Decoding in fMRI, 56 NEUROIMAGE 400,
407 (2011) (discussing how the fMRI can decode brain activity).
145. See Pradeep Suri et al., Longitudinal Associations Between Incident Lumbar Spine MRI
Findings and Chronic Low Back Pain or Radicular Symptoms: Retrospective Analysis of Data
from the Longitudinal Assessment of iImaging and Disability of the Back (LAIDBACK), BMC
MUSCULOSKELETAL DISORDERS 2 (May 13, 2014), http://www.biomedcentral.com/14712474/15/152 (discussing how MRI technology is ineffective in discerning pain caused by lower
back problems and spinal malformations).
146. Id.
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people for whom the tests fail?147 As Professor Greely notes, “the law
would like to have 100 percent certain evidence, but it rarely does.”148
To Professor Greely, the concern about reverse inference was less
imperative. He suggested that there simply would need to be some
acknowledgement that the test was good even if it was not perfect.149 If it
could be accurate 85–95 percent of the time, it would still be useful in
providing some objective evidence, which, along with the other evidence,
could strengthen (or weaken) a case. In the end, Professor Greely suggested
that, in this domain as in all others, it will be the judge’s role to sort out
whether the evidence is strong enough.150 By analogy, Professor Greely
described a case where an eyewitness account is admitted in court as
evidence, even though the accuracy of such witnesses is far less than
perfect.151 In addition to the evidence itself, there is a matter of convincing
a judge or jury that the quality of the evidence is generally sufficiently
reliable to influence a final decision.152 Professor Greely noted that
explaining to a jury how to use neuroimaging evidence would be an
additional potential challenge.153 Yet, despite those challenges, Professor
Greely states that having a test that provides objective evidence in the
majority of cases would be beneficial to society, as more cases would be
decided correctly and more cases would settle, leaving fewer cases
requiring an expensive court process.154 That is, even if the accuracy of the
test and difficulty in their interpretation pose potential additional obstacles,
then as long as they improve the quality of the evidence, their value in
providing some form of objective evidence in a case that can only otherwise
provide subjective claims will likely be worth the problems.

147. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 25.
148. Id. at 23.
149. Id. at 25 (discussing how testing may be only 95 percent accurate, but the degree of
accuracy will force settlements, which he contends is a good thing).
150. Id. at 23.
151. Id.
152. See The Criminal Justice Systems: A Guide for Law Enforcement Officers and Expert
Witnesses in Impaired Driving Cases, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/enforce/GuideforOfficers/pages/Glossary.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2015) (describing that a judge, under the Daubert test, must determine if the evidence is
“relevant” and “reliable”).
153. See Panel 1, supra note 1, at 21 (questioning whether somebody at trial can say, based on
neuroimaging, that this person is in pain or that this person is not in pain).
154. Id. at 24–25.
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LIMITATIONS, CAUTIONARY LESSONS FROM OTHER SCIENCE-LAW
INTERACTIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A.

A Call for Better Technology to Decode Brain Activity?

The panelists disagreed on whether incremental improvements to
existing neuroimaging protocols will result in reliable evidence of pain in
an individual, or whether it will be necessary to develop new protocols and
technologies.155 According to Professor Davis, we need new technology,
not just a better version of what we have: “We can’t just get incrementally
better. We need a different approach, and so I’m hoping that something is
on the horizon.”156 She pointed to recent advances in the area of
optogenetics as one potential future development—it is not yet available for
humans, but it is making rapid progress with likely applications in human
research in the not-so-distant future.157
From many neuroimaging studies on evoked pain in healthy subjects,
we now have a firm understanding of the neural circuits involved in acute
pain.158 Professor Davis pointed out that the most difficult cases for the law
to deal with will be those with claims of chronic pain conditions in which
spontaneous or ongoing pain is prevalent.159 Relatively few neuroimaging
studies have examined ongoing pain,160 and it is not yet clear whether this
type of imaging paradigm would be able to distinguish someone with
chronic pain from a healthy, pain free person. As Professor Davis stated:

155. Compare id. at 12–13 (indicating that Prof. Davis described how we need all new
technology rather than getting incrementally better with neuroimaging), with id. at 3–4 (reporting
that David Seminowicz described the advances made in neuroimaging research and how chronic
pain can now be identified).
156. Id. at 13.
157. Id. at 13. See generally Travis May et. al., Detection of Optogenetic Stimulation in
Somatosensory Cortex by Non-Human Primates - Towards Artificial Tactile Sensation, PLOS ONE
(Dec. 26, 2014), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0114529
(describing the use of optogenetics on non-human primates).
158. Emma G. Duerden & Marie-Claire Albanese, Localization of Pain-Related Brain
Activation: A Meta-Analysis of Neuroimaging Data, 34 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 109, 109–11
(2013).
159. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 23.
160. See, e.g., Matthew A. Howard et. al., Beyond Patient Reported Pain: Perfusion Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Demonstrates Reproducible Cerebral Representation of Ongoing PostSurgical
Pain,
PLOS
ONE
(Feb.
23,
2011),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0017096 (explaining that there
are relatively few neuroimaging reports describing the cerebral representation of ongoing pain,
and fewer still describe clinical ongoing pain).
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This has been the reason why using imaging to look at
chronic pain, instead of acute pain, which you can evoke, is
really, really hard. To determine if somebody is in chronic
pain, you want to put somebody in a scanner or do some
sort of test and not do anything to them, just look, and say,
“is that brain firing on its own, abnormally?”161
B.

Pictures in the Courtroom

Judge Davis added a cautionary note on the use of technology in the
courtroom:
Courts [and] judges have a real concern about imaging
because of the potential of the misuse of pretty pictures.
And the cautionary note that [Professor Davis] struck will
not be struck by those with skin in the game, as [Professor
Greely] [previously] mentioned very astutely. There will be
those, as there already are those out there, ready to push the
technology way beyond the limits of legitimacy. And
courts are very worried about that.162
He recalled when PowerPoint slides were used for the first time in
courtrooms:
it was very controversial. It was very controversial,
because . . . better moneyed, better financed, perhaps better
lawyers, were ahead of the game, and were able, in various
kinds of cases, to bring pretty pictures and great graphics
and great texts on this new phenomenon, and there were
some on the other side [saying], “Judge, that’s not fair! The
jury’s going to be overwhelmed by the pretty pictures” . . . .
And, so we worked that out, and so the price came down,
and the word went out, and so everybody uses PowerPoint
now in the courtroom, but that’s the kind of concern, one of
the concerns, about too early [and] too untested kinds of
imaging that, if I were a plaintiff’s lawyer, I certainly

161. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 23.
162. Id. at 13.
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would try to get pretty pictures of brains in pain before the
jury. And courts will have to guard against that.163
C.

Examples of Other Scientific Evidence in the Legal System

Looking to other examples of the introduction of scientific evidence in
the courtroom, there was concern about the poor quality of the forensic
sciences along with suggestions that we need to take an approach similar to
what was done with the introduction of DNA evidence: establishing a
robust research culture around that evidence.164 From the audience, Judge
Nancy Gertner pointed out other areas where law has depended on science,
including:
forensic science, ballistics, eyewitnesses, [etc.] . . . [experts
have been] trying to come up with standards in advance
[and] to inform what courts do, because otherwise this is
going to be a patchwork quilt. [An ALJ] is in a different
situation because [they are] the decision maker, and [they]
have to write something with respect to this. And so,
arguably, Social Security Disability claims will be where
there is some development of the standards, as opposed to
the jury box, which is a black hole. . . . . But, again, we’re
dealing with a new world and old standards. . . . One thing
that we ought to think about is what kind of standards to do
in advance—to create a gold standard, not have it percolate
through the courts, because it’s not going to percolate
through the courts. You want to have it in advance by
lawyers, scientists, judges, panels, or whatever, to percolate
the gold standard, not the courts.165
Professor Davis disagreed with this point, suggesting that it should be
the neuroscientists who set up the way to determine the gold standard or at
least the criteria for how to achieve such a goal, which applies not only to

163. Id.
164. Id. at 26; see also Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA to Solve
Crimes, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-through-dnatechnology-using-dna-solve-crimes (last updated Sept. 9, 2014) (describing how DNA research is
understood and relied upon as evidence in the courtroom).
165. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 13.
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chronic pain, but also to other areas of neuroimaging research that involve
“mind reading.”166 She was concerned that
the brain imaging community has not been overly
responsive to get onboard with this . . . . People are, for
whatever reason, either not interested or worried about
getting involved or not feeling that it’s their responsibility.
I’ve been trying to figure out whose responsibility it is. Is it
the American Medical Association? Is it the brain imagers?
Is it the pain community? Is it governments? Whose
responsibility is it to set up the gold standard for medical
tests? And, so, I’m hoping that this meeting today will
actually help promote that and move that forward, because
there are small group of folks that do want to do this, and
we’re just kind of stuck in terms of not quite knowing what
channels to go through politically and medically.167
Professor Greely added his thoughts on the need to have a systematic
research program in place in order to get scientific evidence to a point
where it is useful in court. He stated that
DNA is a nice example, [which involved] two national
academy reports to sort of set the population science side of
it, and then [the] FBI sponsored laboratory accreditation to
get the standards and procedures down. I think those two
things—having good science and having good standardized
procedures—are really helpful in any of this stuff.168
Judge Gertner made the comment that much of the discussion on the
panel sounded like “a classic lawyer-scientist conversation. Scientists are
asking for a gold standard, and the law is talking process.”169 She then
asked how this lack of a gold standard in pain cases differs from other types
of gold standards (namely with mental disorders).170

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
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Professor Greely commented that while he thought the issues were
similar in some ways, pain is likely a more common matter in the legal
system. He stated that
Neuroimaging can contribute something to some kinds of
mental—or things that look like mental—problems, like
orbital frontal dementia will show up pretty strongly on a
neuroimaging scan [and] there are some neuroimaging
indications that can be consistent or inconsistent with
Alzheimer’s [although] that’s neurological rather than
mental.171
It was unclear whether the distinction between “mental” and
“neurological” made any difference in court, and Professor Greely
suggested that could be the topic of a future conference.172 From the
audience, Deborah Runkle from the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (“AAAS”) added that “[t]hey say the diseases are
called mental until you can find the physical causes, in which case they
shift over and become neurological.”173
D.

Standards of Pain Measurement and the Need for Objective
Measures in the Law

While many points were raised and discussed in this panel, it was clear
that several issues would not be easily resolved. The panelists described a
disconnect between the way pain is viewed in clinical and research settings
compared to the courts, and the way neuroimaging data could be used and
misused in the legal system.174 Currently, the gold standard for pain
measurement is self reporting,175 where on a 10 point numerical rating
scale, 0 is no pain and 10 is the worst pain imaginable.176 In clinical trials

171. Id. at 18.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., id. at 3 (describing the complexity in the way pain is viewed in neurological
studies).
175. See Panel 2, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing moving the gold standard away from
diagnostic testing).
176. See M. Gabrielle Page et al., Validation of the Numerical Rating Scale for Pain Intensity
and Unpleasantness in Pediatric Acute Postoperative Pain: Sensitivity to Change Over Time, 13 J.
PAIN 359, 359 (2012) (describing how pain is evaluated using a numerical rating scale).
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on chronic pain (excluding headache/migraine trials), the numerical rating
scale continues to be the gold standard.177
Professor Davis pointed out that—at least in the medical world—only
a very small minority (small enough to be considered negligible) of chronic
pain patients are malingerers or fakers.178 In fact, it would be highly
unlikely that a group of patients with a given diagnosis would all fake the
same pattern of symptoms and somehow fake their brain patterns in a
common way.179 The point that Professor Davis touched upon here was that
researchers have been trying to establish “pain signatures” or “biomarkers”
for chronic pain disorders.180 Such signatures could be in the form of
functional patterns of pain related activity, functional connectivity patterns
at rest, or structural anatomical patterns.181 While this area of research is
still in its infancy and requires considerable replication and additional
proofs, it points to the potential for signatures of disease to become a reality
in the near future. A neuroimaging based signature or biomarker could be
used for diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment outcome prediction. Even in the
absence of such an objective biomarker in the medical setting, clinicians
will generally take a patient’s claim of pain at face value.182
While self reporting might be fine for clinical and research purposes, it
might simply be not enough in the legal system. Professor Greely argued
that despite the limitations of pain neuroimaging, the need for objective
evidence in the legal system outweighs them.183 He said that there must be
some additional evidence to back self reporting in order to determine if
claimants are exaggerating the pain or if they are lying about it:

177. Id.
178. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 16.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 22. See, e.g., Irene Tracey & Patrick W. Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain
Perception and Its Modulation, 55 NEURON REV. 377, 377 (2007) (discussing the latest data
regarding the cerebral signature of pain and its modulation in humans); Tor D. Wager et al., An
fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 N. ENG. J. MED. 1388, 1388 (2013)
(describing two different studies that used machine-learning analyses to identify neurological pain
signatures); Marwan Baliki et al., Brain Morphological Signatures for Chronic Pain, PLOS ONE
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0026010
(illustrating several studies that have tried to establish various neurological pain signatures for
chronic pain disorders).
181. See Michael E. Robinson, Pain Measurement and Brain Activity: Will Neuroimages
Replace Pain Ratings?, 14 J. PAIN, 323, 325 (2013) (describing the various forms that a pain
related signature could take).
182. See, e.g., Boadie W. Dunlop & Helen S. Mayberg, Neuroimaging-Based Biomarkers for
Treatment Selection in Major Depressive Disorder, 16 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE
479, 479–80 (2012) (describing the use of neuroimaging based signatures for treatment outcome
predictions in patients suffering from depression disorder).
183. Panel 1, supra note 1, at 10.
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“[determining] [w]hat that evidence is is often going to be really tough, but
I think that, along with that question of value in the pain and suffering,
[those] are the two big problems the legal system has in dealing with
pain.”184 Professor Greely further noted that “[w]e can’t just accept
people’s self assessments. . . . if we did, we’d have a country which was
entirely on disability payments, because getting paid to do nothing is, for
some people, at least for many people, better than getting paid to work.”185
Thus, pain remains a challenge for the legal system as it is hard to quantify,
verify, or deny; with little precedent to set standards for dealing with pain,
each case will follow its own course and rely on different types of evidence.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While there is not yet—and perhaps might never be—an objective
measurement of pain, the panel agreed that pain neuroimaging could
provide useful information for the legal system in the form of aggregated
data from healthy people and chronic pain patients. Additionally, pain
neuroimaging could provide this kind of information possibly in the near
future through a pain measurement neuroimaging test using existing or new
technology. The panel, however, pointed out several reasons to proceed
with caution.186 These reasons included limitations of the neuroimaging
technology and the need for systematic research in a way that is comparable
to the development of DNA testing, as well as the need for limitations of
the judge and jury in assessing neuroimaging evidence.187

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., id. at 13 (describing the limitations of neurological imaging and potential issues
with using neurological imaging in court).
187. See id. at 26 (discussing the importance of having standardized procedures for evaluating
scientific evidence such as DNA).

